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Claims Limit Change: Small Claims Court Increase to $50,000 Per Plaintiff
Question: How will the upcoming increase in Ontario's Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction affect my existing case?
Answer: Effective October 1, 2025, Ontario Small Claims Court's monetary jurisdiction will rise to $50,000. For cases initiated before this date, the existing $35,000 cap remains until the new regulation takes effect. Once operative, plaintiffs may seek to amend claims to the new limit, provided it is done before judgment and fairness is maintained. This change opens a strategic opportunity to maximise your claim value. Stay proactive and consult Small Claims Court Jurisdiction, O. Reg. 626/00 for detailed legal guidance.
Forthcoming Increase of Monetary Jurisdiction
Effective October 1, 2025, the monetary jurisdiction of Ontario Small Claims Court will increase from $35,000 to $50,000 per plaintiff. This regulatory amendment represents a significant development within the civil justice system of Ontario by expanding access to the expedited and cost-effective procedures of the Small Claims Court for a broader monetary range of legal disputes.
Effective Date and Legislative Basis
The change to the Small Claims Court limit is enacted within the Small Claims Court Jurisdiction, O. Reg. 626/00 regulation, recently amended by O. Reg. 42/25, made under the authority of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, whereas it is said:
Jurisdiction
1. (1) The maximum amount of a claim in the Small Claims Court is $35,000.
(2) The maximum amount of a claim over which a deputy judge may preside is $35,000.
Note: On October 1, 2025, section 1 of the Regulation is amended by striking out “$35,000” wherever it appears and substituting in each case “$50,000”. (See: O. Reg. 42/25, s. 1)
Jointly Brought Claims
Involving Multiple Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs, for claims issued on or after October 1, 2025, will be entitled to pursue up to $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs. It is notable that, as always, the Small Claims Court limit continues to apply on a per Plaintiff basis, which means that in multi-party litigation, each Plaintiff may seek the full amount independently. The right for each Plaintiff to independently pursue the full Small Claims Court limit, is explained within the cases of, among others, Lock v. Waterloo (Regional Municipality), 2011 CarswellOnt 15974, Kent v. Conquest Vacations, 2005 CanLII 2321, Bleeks v. Keenan, 2014 CanLII 90436, as well as McCruden v. Nead, 2018 CanLII 123230, wherein each it was said:
13 The same point has been addressed under the Simplified Procedure provided in Rule 76 of the Rules of the Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. There is a monetary limit for the mandatory application of that procedure and it has been held that multiple plaintiffs each claiming within the monetary limit can be properly joined in one claim: Baker v. Chrysler Canada Ltd. (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 729 (Ont. Gen. Div.), leave to appeal denied 112 O.A.C. 277 (Ont. Div. Ct.). It has also been held that Rule 76 should be liberally interpreted to carry out its policy of containing the cost of litigating the smaller claims to which it applies: Lillie v. Bisson (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 94 (Ont. C.A.). In my view both of those principles are equally true of proceedings in the Small Claims Court.
14 To hold otherwise would be to require that the case at bar be divided into two actions involving virtually identical allegations of fact and law. I see no useful purpose in requiring that multiplicity of proceedings, nor any proper basis to do so under the law of joinder or the law defining this court's jurisdiction.
15 Section 23(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act gives this court jurisdiction "in any action for the payment of money where the amount claimed does not exceed the prescribed amount..." "Action" is defined under s. 1(1) of the Act only as including proceedings, other than applications, commenced by a not-exhaustive list of originating documents. The list does not refer to the Small Claims Court and does not mention the Plaintiff's Claim which, along with the Defendant's Claim, is the originating document in this court.
16 Section 1(1) of O.Reg. 626/00 sets the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, stating that "The maximum amount of a claim in the Small Claims Court is $25,000." That differs from s. 23(1) by referring to a "claim" in this court rather than an "action" in this court. As was found in Action Auto Leasing & Gallery Inc. v. Robillard (2011), 106 O.R. (3d) 281 (Ont. Div. Ct.), dealing with the minimum appealable amount, there is a material inconsistency between the language of the Act and the language of the corresponding regulation.
17 The Courts of Justice Act and its regulations should be interpreted liberally and as a coherent package. In my view, properly interpreted, the effect of the applicable provisions is that plaintiffs suing together in one action in the Small Claims Court may properly each claim damages up to the maximum monetary jurisdiction of the court.
8 While the damages of the individual parties arise out of a common transaction, they need not be asserted in a single action. Rule 5 of the Rules of the Superior Court, although not directly applicable to the Small Claims Court, is instructive. It provides that two or more plaintiffs, if represented by the same solicitor, “may” join as the plaintiffs in the same proceeding where their claims arise out of the same transaction. The joinder is voluntary.
Rule 6.02 states “A cause of action shall not be divided into two or more actions for the purpose of bringing it within the Courts jurisdiction”.
Letang v. Cooper [ 1964] All E.R. 1929 (C.A.) ] defines a cause of action as “a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person”. That definition was cited in Royal Bank of Canada v. Metcalf in [1985] 3 C.P.C. (2nd) 228 (ONT. DIST. COURT), which case went on to say that a cause of action is “a factual situation which entitles one person to recover damages from a Defendant” (paragraph 5). In this case, each Plaintiff had an individual retainer with Defendant Keenan and his firm, and, each of the Plaintiffs paid one-fifth of the amount owing pursuant to the cost award and each suffered an individual amount of damages if they are ultimately found to be successful.
Secondly, the Plaintiffs made a claim based on negligence. In Lock v. Waterloo (Regional Municipality) [2011] OJ No. 4898 , it was held that each Plaintiff had a separate cause of action arising from the same tort. See also Tope v. Stratford (City) [1994] OJ No.3097.
Was There A Contract With Each Plaintiff... Are there Individual Torts?
In Kent v. Conquest Vacations Co. [2005] No. 1311, 138 A. C.W.S. (3rd) 426 it was held that both Plaintiffs, Mr. Kent and Mrs. Kent entered into separate contracts with Conquest Vacations and accordingly had an independent cause of action against Conquest Vacations. That decision was affirmed in KNP Headwear Inc. v. Levinson [2005] OJ No.5438, 2605 OAC 291. In this matter we are dealing with a lawyer/client relationship in which there is a claim for breach of contract, Negligence, misrepresentation etc.
The Kent decision would indicate that we are dealing with individual actions in contract and the Lock and Tope decisions referred to above indicate that we are dealing with individual torts. Those cases indicate that the cases should be tried together for reasons of logic, efficiency, and it would be beneficial to the Judicial process. Rule 6.01 (1), the Rules of Civil Procedure allow the Court to order the proceedings be heard at the same time so as to ensure efficiency in the legal process.
I find that each Plaintiff entered into a separate retainer or contract with the Defendants giving rise to a separate cause of action against the Defendants. The retainer may have different consequences to each Plaintiff depending on what evidence is presented at trial in relation to each individual’s dealings with the Defendants. The Defendants argued that because the Plaintiffs’ liability is joint and several there was one cause of action and Rule 6.02 of the Small Claims Court Act is applicable. However, where the Plaintiffs are joint and severally liable to the Town and Molinaro in their claim against the Town and Molinaro the claim against the Defendants is a different issue, Rule 23(1) (a) the Courts of Justice Act states that the Small Claims Court (a) “has jurisdiction in any action for the payment of money where the amount claimed does not exceed the prescribed amount exclusive of interest and costs ....”
The Kent decision interprets Rule 6.02 of the Small Claims Court Act has “preventing a single individual from dividing one action to come within the Court’s jurisdiction” (See note 16 in paragraph 8)
Judgment
I find that each Plaintiff has a separate contract with the Defendant Keenan and his firm the Defendant Collucci and each Plaintiff may have a separate claim for negligence as well. Therefore, each is entitled to a separate claim in Small Claims Court against the Defendants. Accordingly the Plaintiffs’ claims shall be tried together as directed by the Trial Judge.
I find that the loan was a contract between John and Adriana as lenders and MedviewMD as borrower and that the contract has been breached by the failure of MedviewMD to repay the loan. Each of John and Adriana claim the sum of $33,500.00 (one-half the amount of the loan) on the basis that each has a separate cause of action against MedviewMD. In paragraph 79 of the Claim they waive any damages in excess of the Court’s monetary jurisdiction of $25,000.00.
“A cause of action has been defined as a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person” as per Lord Justice Diplock in Letang v. Cooper, [1964] All E.R. 929 (C.A.) at page 934. This definition has been accepted by Canadian courts many times.
The loan funds came from a joint line of credit for which the plaintiffs would be jointly and severally liable. They have separate causes of action both arising from the same factual situation. Each could have separately brought an action in this court for $25,000.00 for breach of contract without infringing Rule 6.02 which provides that a cause of action shall not be divided into two or more actions for the purpose of bringing it into the court’s jurisdiction. To commence separate actions, however, would cause a multiplicity of proceedings which is, in the interest of justice, to be avoided.
In Lock v. Waterloo (Regional Municipality) (c.o.b. Grand River Transit) [2011] O.J. No.4898, Deputy Judge Winny, in an action for damages based on personal injury to the two plaintiffs, found that each of the plaintiffs was entitled to claim damages up to the court’s monetary limit as they had two separate causes of action.
In the case of Kent v. Conquest Vacations, 2005 CanLII 2321, the Divisional Court on appeal from the Small Claims Court decided that each of the plaintiffs was entitled to assert his/her cause of action for damages for breach of contract against the defendant in the same action.
I therefore find that each of John McCruden and Adriana McCruden are entitled to judgment against MedviewMD in the amount of $25,000.00 each.
Transitional Restrictions
Effect Upon Existing Cases
For claims issued before October 1, 2025, including claims commenced even before the announcement of the increase, the existing $35,000 jurisdictional cap continues to apply until the new regulation takes effect. The court is unable to receive or process claims exceeding $35,000 until the regulatory change becomes operative. Accordingly, parties considering issuing new claims that are near or just above the current cap may wish to weigh the benefits of delaying issuance, while heeding any applicable limitation expiry dates, until the higher limit is in force.
Importantly, once the new $50,000 jurisdiction is in place, existing claims filed under the $35,000 cap may be amended to increase the sum claimed, subject to court discretion and provided that such amendments are made prior to the rendering of Judgment. Courts have consistently treated increases to the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court as procedural in nature, permitting such amendments where appropriate.
“... amendments increasing the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court were procedural in nature and could therefore be relied upon in an action that has been commenced before the effective date ...”
~ Deputy Judge Bédard
Commisso v. 1132165 Ontario Ltd., [2004] O.J. No. 2235
The permissibility to increase a claim that was issued prior to a monetary jurisdiction increase, so long as the increase request is brought after the increase takes effect, is expressed in many cases.
Precedent Case Commentary
Authories for Increasing Existing Cases
In Fast Money ATM Inc. v. Inkas Security Services Ltd., [2011] O.J. No. 5279, the Plaintiff sought to amend two previously issued claims, each capped at the $10,000 jurisdictional limit in place at the time of commencement, to the updated $25,000 limit. The Court accepted that the prior abandonment of any award above $10,000 was revocable and that jurisdictional increases are procedural in nature. Deputy Judge Prattas ruled that where prejudice to the Defendant was absent and where the facts were fully known to both parties from the outset, the amendment was appropriate and just. Specifically, in Fast Money it was said:
29 The defendants knew from the issuance of the two Claims that the amounts sought by the plaintiff were more than $10,000.00 for each Claim and that the plaintiff waived or abandoned any amounts over $10,000.00 simply to come within the monetary jurisdiction of the court as it existed at that time. There were no undisclosed facts presented at trial nor were the defendants deprived of the opportunity to meet and rebut the facts and the case of the plaintiff. There were no surprises for the defendants other than the fact that the plaintiff wanted to avail itself of the increased monetary jurisdiction. An opportunity was given to them to file opposing material, which they did, and to argue the motion as they saw fit, which they also did.
30 The defendants were also obligated to present their best case at trial. They are not allowed to try a case by instalments. They were aware from the beginning that the actual damages sought by the plaintiff were greater than the $10,000.00 pursued to meet the jurisdictional limit.
31 In the case of Commisso v. 1132165 Ontario Ltd., [2004] O.J. No. 2235 (OSCJ - SCC Toronto), Bedard DJ had this to say on this point in paragraph 22:
The Defendants knew from the beginning that the plaintiff claimed that his damages exceeded the monetary value of the Small Claims Court as it existed at the time of initiating the procedures. The Defendants were under the obligation to present the best available evidence to the Court. (emphasis added)
32 From what I heard there was nothing stopping the defendants from presenting their best case at trial. The lengthy history of these Claims further reinforces the fact that they had ample opportunity to prepare and present such case. Nor did they provide any particular examples of how they may have approached the cases differently because of the monetary increases sought by the plaintiff.
33 It is established that amendments increasing the monetary jurisdiction are procedural in nature and can be relied on in an action commenced prior to such amendments. In the case of Johanson v. Williamson (1977) 18 O.R. (2d) 585 (Ont Dist Crt), District Court Judge Fitzgerald put it this way:
In the present case I can see no vested right of the defendants that is disturbed by permitting the plaintiff to amend to take advantage of the increased jurisdiction, nor on the facts of this case are the defendants surprised or prejudiced. I therefore hold that the change in monetary jurisdiction is merely a change in the method of enforcing an existing right and is hence procedural and applies to cases pending when the increase came into effect; subject of course to amendment only on proper terms and the non-interference with vested remedies. (emphasis added)
34 Does the abandonment of any excess over the monetary jurisdiction estop a plaintiff from seeking an increased amount following an amendment in that monetary jurisdiction?
35 This precise question was dealt with in the case of Johanson. In commenting on this point, Bedard DJ in Commisso stated the following in paragraph 20:
Judge Fitzgerald also observed that the plaintiff is not precluded from making such an amendment by virtue of having previously abandoned the larger sum in excess of the former jurisdictional limit. Such abandonment, says Judge Fitzgerald, is not irrevocable and the amendment may be allowed subject to proper terms. (emphasis added)
36 Therefore, being procedural, any waiver or abandonment to come within the monetary jurisdiction is not irrevocable and can be subsequently invoked to bring a previously commenced action within its current monetary limit on proper terms.
37 In arriving at my decision on this motion, I have also been guided by the following additional precepts.
38 Firstly, the provisions of section 25 of the Courts of Justice Act, that in hearing and determining a matter this court may make any order that is considered just and agreeable to good conscience.
39 Secondly, the provisions of section 24 (3) of the Courts of Justice Act, that a deputy judge of this court has the jurisdiction to hear a case up to its monetary jurisdiction limit.
Similarly, in M.Y.A. General Contracting Inc. v. Cavé City Developers Corp., 2020 CanLII 20513 (ON SCSM), the Court permitted a mid-trial amendment to increase the claim amount from $25,000 to $35,000 following the jurisdictional increase effective January 1, 2020. The Court found a lack of prejudice to the Defendant, noting that the amendment aligned with procedural fairness and access to justice principles. In M.Y.A. it was said:
24. Chad Piovesan, counsel for the plaintiff, brought a motion at the end of the evidence to amend his claim to $35,000, citing Fast Money ATM Inc. v. Inkas Security Services [2011] OJ No 5279. The monetary jurisdiction of this court was raised effective January 1, 2020. I held that there was no prejudice to the defendant, and granted the motion. He is alleging damages exceeding $37,000, and is waiving the overage. …
Earlier still, in Commisso v. 1132165 Ontario Ltd., [2004] O.J. No. 2235, the Small Claims Court allowed an amendment to increase the amount of a claim following a jurisdictional change, holding that the Plaintiff was permitted to revive an earlier-abandoned portion of the claim. The Court emphasized that such increases are procedural and that amendments should be allowed on appropriate terms, especially where the addition of new facts is absent and absence of prejudice exists. In Commisso it was said:
16 The Statement of Claim gave a clear indication that the damages suffered by the plaintiff were in excess of $6,000.00 and that the excess amount was waived for the sole purpose of bringing the action within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. The jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court was increased from $6,000.00 to $10,000.00 effective April 2, 2001.
17 The Defendants counsel brought to the Court's attention the decision of Helsberg v. Sutton Group Achievers Realty Inc., [2002] O.J. No 2311. In Helsberg, it was decided that the increase of the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court was of a substantive nature and therefore not of a retroactive effect as opposed to being merely procedural.
18 The facts in Helsberg were quite different from those in this case. In Helsberg, a deputy judge of the Small Claims Court had heard a case where the amount claimed was in excess of the then jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. In Helsberg, the Superior Court determined that the increase to the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court in 2001 did not retroactively absolve a situation where the amount claimed was outside of the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court and was heard more than two years prior to the coming into force of a new regulation increasing the monetary jurisdiction of this court.
19 More relevant to the situation at hand is the decision of Johanson v. Williamson (1977) 18 O.R. (2d) 585. It dealt specifically with the issue of a plaintiff who had abandoned a portion of his or her claim to keep it within the Small Claims Court jurisdiction and who wanted to increase the amount to be within the new monetary limit.
20 In Johanson, District Court Judge Fitzgerald held that the amendments increasing the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court were procedural in nature and could therefore be relied upon in an action that has been commenced before the effective date of the amending statute. Judge Fitzgerald also observed that the plaintiff is not precluded from making such an amendment by virtue of having previously abandoned the larger sum in excess of the former jurisdictional limit. Such abandonment, says Judge Fitzgerald, is not irrevocable and the amendment may be allowed subject to proper terms.
21 A deputy judge of the Small Claims Court has the jurisdiction to hear a case up to the monetary value of the Small Claims Court jurisdiction. At the time of hearing the case in this matter, the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court is $10,000.00.
22 The Defendants knew from the beginning that the plaintiff claimed that his damages exceeded the monetary value of the Small Claims Court as it existed at the time of initiating the procedures. The Defendants were under the obligation to present the best available evidence to the Court. Consequently, I will make right to the amendment but will take into account, in the determination of costs, that the offers, if any, had been considered on the basis of the claim as it existed when the trial began.
These decisions collectively establish that when jurisdictional limits are increased by regulation, litigants with pre-existing claims may amend to take advantage of the new limit — subject to judicial discretion and fairness. The courts have consistently characterized such increases as procedural rather than substantive, allowing Plaintiffs to proceed on amended claims so long as fairness to the opposing party is preserved.
Notice of Intent to Amend
Providing Fair Warning to Defendants
Where a claim is already issued at the $35,000 limit, strategic use of a Notice of Intent to Amend is highly recommended. By delivering this notice to the Defendant in advance of October 1, the Plaintiff signals an intention to amend the claim upward to $50,000 as soon as the regulatory change becomes effective. Providing such notice serves a dual purpose: it promotes transparency and procedural fairness while also mitigating the potential for the Defendant to raise objections grounded in prejudice or surprise.
The earlier a Notice of Intent to Amend is served, the more difficult it will be for the Defendant to later argue that the amendment caused procedural unfairness or deprived the Defendant of an opportunity to fully respond. Courts have consistently emphasized that prejudice must be demonstrated on a balance of probabilities. Proactive notice will therefore strengthen the position of a Plaintiff if judicial leave to amend is later sought.
Ultimately, parties are encouraged to carefully evaluate the structure, timing, and value, of claims in light of the jurisdictional increase and to document all steps taken in anticipation of the transition.
Conclusion
The upcoming jurisdictional increase marks a significant shift in the scope and utility of the Small Claims Court. While this change broadens opportunities for future litigants, it also presents a strategic opening for parties in ongoing matters. With established jurisprudence confirming the permissibility of amendments to increase the amount claimed post-regulation, Plaintiffs to existing matters should act diligently to reassess claims that may soon qualify for amendment. Timely and informed action may yield substantial benefits under the new $50,000 cap, making it essential to stay current and responsive as this regulatory change comes into effect.
